




In Europe and especially in Germany, restrictions
on employment-based immigration from non-EU
countries are about to be eased and/or redefined in
immigration laws. The number and composition of
immigrants may be selected on the basis of priori-
ty lists or point systems. One could also think of
selecting the immigrants according to their willing-
ness to pay for an immigration certificate or the
willingness of domestic to pay for such certificates
for employees of their choice – the auction model.
How do point systems and auction models com-
pare as selection mechanism for permanent immi-
gration?
Why employment-based immigration may be
desirable
Employment-based immigration may be desirable
in receiving countries for a number of reasons. It
can prevent spiralling wages that result from
labour-market bottlenecks. It can contribute to a
more dynamic economy and thus boost economic
growth. It can also counteract the ageing of the
population and help maintain the pension system.
In general, immigration increases the income of
the domestic population since immigrants con-
tribute more to value added and hence to the GDP
of the receiving country than they receive in wages.
For this reason the host country has good reasons
for easing immigration restrictions. On the other
hand, immigration also causes considerable distor-
tions in income distribution, since those domestic
workers whose services are substitutes for those of
the immigrants will lose from immigration. The
gainers are domestic workers with complementary
services, whose incomes will increase, and especial-
ly the owners of capital who can achieve higher
returns on capital. Since the gains outweigh the
losses, immigration makes sense, but since there
are serious redistribution effects, it matters
whether immigration is controlled by quotas or by
prices.
In addition to the economic and demographic ben-
efits of employment-based immigration, attention
must also be given to social and cultural aspects,
and hence to the new immigrants ability to inte-
grate. Immigration should also pose no threat to
national security.
Mechanisms for immigrant selection
Various instruments may be used in the selection
of immigrants. Countries with a tradition of immi-
gration use priority lists (United States) or point
systems (Canada, Australia, New Zealand). The
American priority lists contain a ranking of desir-
able skills, with priority given to applicants with
the highest qualifications. In the point systems,
points are awarded for the various requirements
met by an applicant.Applicants who reach a mini-
mum of points may immigrate unless an annual
immigration quota is surpassed.
As an alternative to selection methods now in use,
some economists have proposed selection on the
basis of a sale of immigration rights (Becker and
Becker, 1996, pp. 58ff.). These could be in the form
of immigration fees or immigration taxes. This
instrument would select those immigrants who are
prepared to pay a price set by the government of the
receiving country.Or the immigration permits could
be auctioned,in which case the price of immigration
would be determined by what it is worth to the bid-
der.An auction could be directed at potential immi-
grants. Immigration rights could also be bought by
domestic companies that wish to employ foreign
workers (Bauer 1998, pp. 79ff.).1
Determinants of the efficiency of selection 
mechanisms
The efficiency of selection mechanisms depends on
various factors, including the immigration objectives
of the receiving country. Efficiency is influenced by
whether the objectives are short-term like meeting
current labour needs, or longer term, such as achiev-
ing permanent employment for the immigrants.
For the selection of the immigrants, it is not suffi-
cient to know the objectives that are being pur-
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sued. More important is knowing the immigrant
mix to be achieved by the chosen objectives. This
means that the effects of immigration must be
known that result from immigrants with differing
structural characteristics.
The efficiency of the selection mechanism is also
dependent on the state of information of those
who develop the point system or who take part in
the auctions. The governments of the receiving
countries that create the point lists know the eco-
nomic and demographic situation of their own
country relatively well.They can also appraise the
social, cultural and security implications of immi-
gration. They do not, however, have sufficient
knowledge of the qualifications of the immi-
grants. Domestic companies have precise knowl-
edge of their short- and medium term labour
needs, and of the skills of the foreign workers
they wish to employ. They, however, are not so
well informed of the demographic, social, cultural
and security consequences of immigration as the
government.The immigrants,finally,are very well
aware of their qualifications but are not well
informed about the conditions that prevail in the
receiving countries. For all three groups, the state
of information declines with an increasing time
horizon.
The effectiveness of the selection mechanism is
also determined by the fact that the decisions of
governments, domestic companies and immigrants
are based on their own interests. Governments, as
a rule, take into consideration not only the eco-
nomic and demographic but also the social, cultur-
al and security aspects. Domestic companies are
primarily guided by their short-term and medium-
term profit expectations. What they are willing to
pay depends on the contribution the immigrant is
expected to make to the company; other conse-
quences of immigration are not taken into
account. Immigrants are interested in achieving a
high standard of living in the host country, and
what they are willing to pay is an expression of
these expectations.They are only interested in the
consequences of immigration for the receiving
country to the extent that this affects their own
standard of living.
Finally, the costs associated with the implementa-
tion of the individual selection mechanism affect
its efficiency. The costs of the point system are
probably higher than those of the auction model.
Advantages and disadvantages of the point system
The point system has a number of advantages in
selecting immigrants. The experience of the coun-
tries that use it shows that the system works and is
easy to handle. The immigration mix can be con-
trolled so that at least the short and medium-term
economic and integration-related requirements of
the receiving country are met.Selection accuracy is
relatively high even though there are limits result-
ing from the fact that only measurable factors can
be used as selection criteria.A point system is also
widely accepted by the domestic population (see
Table 1).
The disadvantages of the point system are the high
administrative costs associated with the creation
and adjustment of the point system and with the
examination of applicant qualifications. There are
also considerable methodological problems in
identifying labour shortages by occupation and
industry (Bauer 1998, pp. 117ff.). In addition, the
time lag between obtaining the labour-market data
used to identify labour shortages and the actual
immigration may lead to incorrect choices of
immigrants; moreover, most immigrants are young
with long and changeable working lives ahead of
them. Point systems are also relatively inflexible
and slow in reacting to unforeseen circumstances
(Zimmermann 2000, p. 17). Inflexibility is caused
by the time involved in establishing new selection
criteria. The receiving countries must also grant
potential applicants sufficient planning scope. A
final disadvantage lies in the distribution effects in
the receiving country. The advantages of immigra-
tion in the form of avoiding wage increases result-
ing from labour shortages accrue to the companies;
the disadvantages are felt by the affected domestic
Table 1
Advantages and Disadvantages of the Point System
Advantages Disadvantages
• Simple and easy-to-use 
system
• Immigration selection 
based on economic and 
integration-related needs 
(at least in the short and 
medium term)
• Accepted by the domestic 
population
• Creation of the points sys-
tem and decking qualifi-
cations of applicants is time 
consuming
• Problems in identifying 
labour shortages by occu-
pation and industry 
(measurement and lag 
problems)
• Low flexibility in unfore-
seen circumstances
• Undesirable distribution 
effects in receiving country
Source: Compiled by the Ifo Institute.workers whose wages rise more slowly than would
otherwise have been the case (if indeed they do not
fall).
How the auction model works
Instead of an administrative determination of
future labour needs and the derived skill profile of
immigrants, immigrants may also be selected by
auctioning immigration rights. The proponents of
the auction model assume that the willingness to
pay is highest among those who have the most to
gain from immigration.The greater the willingness
of the immigrants to pay, the higher the utility of
the receiving country from the immigration
(Becker and Becker, pp. 58ff.).
Before immigration rights are auctioned, several
fundamental decisions must be made. First, the
number of immigration certificates per year must
be determined. Then the decision must be made
whether to sell these to potential immigrants or to
companies that need foreign workers. Finally, it
must be determined whether the immigration right
is tied to the purchaser or whether the buyer has
the right to sell the certificate or to receive a refund
when returning it to the issuing authorities (Bauer
1998, pp. 88ff.). The most practical method of auc-
tioning immigration rights is a sealed-bid auction
with the highest bidders winning the auction.
Advantages and disadvantages of the auction
model
In comparison to point systems, the auctioning of
immigration rights has the advantage of allocating
the immigration certificates via the price mecha-
nism thus considerably reducing administrative
expenses. At the same time, the price mechanism
ensures that immigration is geared to the econom-
ic and demographic requirements of the receiving
country. Potential immigrants are only likely to
place high bids if the labour market in the receiv-
ing country holds the promise of a good income.
The skills and work experience of the auction par-
ticipants with the highest bids indicate the areas
with a short and medium-term demand for labour,
insofar as the potential immigrants are sufficiently
informed of the conditions in the receiving coun-
try. The state receives income from the auctions
which can be used in part for financing the public
goods consumed by the immigrants. Public accep-
tance of immigration is also raised if immigrants
pay to get in (see Table 2).
Although the auction model may result in the
selection of the “right” immigrants,this is not guar-
anteed. Assume that the receiving country wishes
to select only highly qualified workers.If,for exam-
ple, a good education helps achieve a relatively
high income in the home country, then qualified
workers stand to gain only little from migration
but unqualified workers much more. For this rea-
son the latter will offer a higher price at an auction
than the former and acquire the immigration cer-
tificate. Social transfers in the receiving country
can also lead to adverse selection (Bauer 1998, pp.
97ff.;Borjas 1994).Imperfect financial markets can
mean that poor but highly qualified applicants lose
out at an auction to more wealthy but less qualified
applicants. Moreover, the information deficits of
the potential immigrants with respect to the eco-
nomic conditions in the receiving country can
diminish the efficiency of the auction model as a




Advantages and Disadvantages of the Auction Model
A. Auctioning immigration certificates to potential 
immigrants
Advantages Disadvantages
• Allocation of immigration 
certificates via the price 
mechanism
• Immigration geared to 
economic and demographic 
requirements via the price 
mechanism (limited by in-
formation deficits)
• Identification of short and 
medium-term labour 
shortages (limited by in-
formation deficits)
• Revenue from auctions
• Payment raises public 
acceptance of immigration
• Selection of the “right” im-
migrants possible but not 
guaranteed
• Information deficit about 
receiving country is greater
on the part of the potential 
immigrant than on the part 
of the receiving country
• Receiving country provides 
no information on its needs
• Makes immigration more 
expensive; immigrants 
prefer countries with point 
systems
• Ethical objections make 
political implementation 
difficult
• Overlooks immigrant’s 
ability to integrate 
B. Auctioning immigration certificates to domestic
companies
The appraisals in A is changed in the following areas:
• Avoidance of unwanted distribution effects in the receiving
country
• Companies’ state of information on short and medium-
term labour needs is better than that of immigrants
• Disregards long-term opportunities of immigrants in the
labour market (long-term employability)
• Ethical objections will play a less important role
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the receiving country makes no information avail-
able regarding its needs.
Apart from the insufficient efficiency of selection,
the auction model has further disadvantages.
Firstly,the auction model makes immigration more
expensive by taking away from immigrants a por-
tion of their immigration gains. Immigrants will
thus prefer countries with a point system which
leave them a higher net income. A further disad-
vantage is the difficulty of political implementa-
tion, since some voters will have ethical objections
to an auctioning of immigration certificates.A final
drawback is that only the personal welfare gains of
the immigrant go into the selection decision and
that effects of immigration on the receiving coun-
try receive too little attention (e.g. the problem of
integration ability).
Most of the advantages and disadvantages associ-
ated with auctioning immigration rights to poten-
tial immigrants also apply to auctions in which
domestic companies are the bidders. But there are
four major exceptions.Auctions for domestic com-
panies prevent the unwanted distribution effects of
immigration in the receiving country. The compa-
nies must pay a portion of what they gain from
immigration for the purchase of immigration
licenses. This revenue can be used by the state to
compensate for detrimental effects on domestic
workers. A further difference is that the state of
information of the companies on the short and
medium-term labour needs are better than that of
the immigrants. This leads to selection advantages
both in the short and the medium term. On the
other hand,in their bidding,companies will tend to
ignore the long-term employment opportunities of
immigrants with varying skills.As a rule, they have
no exact knowledge of the long-term labour needs
of their company and of the economy, nor must
they include the long-term employability of the
immigrant in their decision since they can always
dismiss the employee at a later date.Finally,ethical
consideration play a less important role in the auc-
tioning of immigration certificates to companies
than to individuals.
Conclusions
Sustained immigration has considerable economic,
demographic, social, integration-related, and cul-
tural consequences for the receiving country.
Public acceptance is only assured if the number of
immigrants and the immigrant mix is controlled in
a way that closely corresponds to the objectives of
the receiving country.
The point system and the two auction models take
advantage of the information available to the
administration of the receiving country,the domes-
tic companies, or the potential immigrants. All
three have information advantages and deficits in
their own areas. Their interests are also different.
In appraising the advantages of the selection
mechanisms, an assessment of the relevance and
validity of the information on which the mecha-
nisms rest is necessary. In doing this, the differing
interests of the information holders must be taken
into consideration. A combination of selection
methods may also reduce the information deficits
as much as possible.
The point system and the auction model have
advantages and disadvantages as instruments of a
selective immigration policy. In a comparison, the
point system seems to come out on top.To be sure,
the auction model has the considerable advantage
of allocating the immigration certificates via the
price mechanism and gearing immigration to the
economic and demographic conditions of the
receiving country. It thus avoids the high adminis-
trative costs of the point system. On the other
hand, the selection of “suitable” immigrants only
works well when domestic companies bid for the
certificates, and then only in the case of short and
medium-term labour needs.The long-term employ-
ability and the integration ability of the immigrants
are largely ignored.The auction model also makes
immigration more expensive and thus reduces the
attractiveness of the auctioning country vis-à-vis
countries with a point system. Finally, the auction
model, especially when directed at individual
applicants, faces ethical objections and is thus
more difficult to implement than a point system.
Compared to the auction model, the point system
has the advantage of having proven itself in prac-
tice.As a selection mechanism it fulfils its function
very well and can take account of both the eco-
nomically relevant criteria for immigration as well
as integration and other long-term aspects. To be
sure, the point system has high administrative
costs,unwanted distribution effects in the receiving
country, less flexibility, and more problems in
determining labour market needs. However, thelatter two deficits have negative effects primarily
on short-term selection decisions rather than on
those of long-term relevance which are typical for
immigration.
For selection decisions of short or medium-term
relevance, i.e. for temporary immigration, auctions
in which domestic companies participate are a bet-
ter option. The strength of auctions is their ability
to identify short and medium-term labour short-
ages and to react flexibly to market changes.
Moreover, they avoid the undesirable distribution
effects of immigration in the receiving countries
because the companies pay out a portion of their
gains from immigration and the state can use its
income to lower taxes for the benefit of the substi-
tuted labour.
With a combination of the point system and the auc-
tion model, the long-term immigration criteria
would be taken indirectly into consideration even
for temporary immigration.In choosing a country of
immigration, a potential immigrant contemplating a
temporary working visa would also work out his
chances of passing the point test later for receiving
permanent immigrant status; if the chances for this
are not good, he may choose another country where
permanent status is more likely (self selection).
Conversely, applicants for permanent immigration
may include immigrants who came on a temporary
basis, for whom domestic companies indicated a
high demand during the auction.
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